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ABSTRACT
Web search logs contain extremely sensitive data, as evidenced by
the recent AOL incident. However, storing and analyzing search
logs can be very useful for many purposes (i.e. investigating human
behavior). Thus, an important research question is how to privately
sanitize search logs. Several search log anonymization techniques
have been proposed with concrete privacy models. However, in
all of these solutions, the output utility of the techniques is only
evaluated rather than being maximized in any fashion. Indeed, for
effective search log anonymization, it is desirable to derive the op-
timal (maximum utility) output while meeting the privacy standard.
In this paper, we propose utility-maximizing sanitization based on
the rigorous privacy standard of differential privacy, in the context
of search logs. Specifically, we utilize optimization models to max-
imize the output utility of the sanitization for different applications,
while ensuring that the production process satisfies differential pri-
vacy. An added benefit is that our novel randomization strategy
ensures that the schema of the output is identical to that of the in-
put. A comprehensive evaluation on real search logs validates the
approach and demonstrates its robustness and scalability.
Keywords: Search Logs, Differential Privacy, Optimization
1. INTRODUCTION
Search engines are used by millions, if not billions, of people
every day. The queries posed by the users form a large volume of
data that can give great insight into human behavior via their search
intent. Indeed, such data is invaluable for researchers and data ana-
lyzers in numerous fields [11]. For example, search engines them-
selves can use web search logs to identify common spelling errors,
to recommend similar queries, or to expand queries. Many other
applications also make use of search log data, such as the analysis
of living habits from daily search, and the detection of epidemics
[9]. For this reason, search log data is collected, stored, and ana-
lyzed in different ways by all search engines.
However, one problem with the storage and release of search log
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data is the potential for privacy breach. The queries that a user
poses may sometimes reveal their most private interests and con-
cerns. Thus, if search log data is published without sanitization or
with trivial anonymization (such as simply replacing user ids by
pseudonyms), many sensitive queries and clicks can be explicitly
acquired by adversaries. [3, 11] demonstrates that it can only take
a couple of hours to breach a particular user’s privacy in the absence
of good anonymization. Thus, it is crucial to anonymize search log
data appropriately before storing or releasing it.
There has been significant work on database anonymization that
looks at how to anonymize relational data. However, much of this
work is not directly applicable since there are significant differ-
ences between search logs and relational data. Indeed, search logs
pose additional challenges for anonymization. First, there is no
explicit distinction between quasi-identifiers and sensitive infor-
mation in search logs. Each user may pose hundreds of queries
that involve lots of personal information (i.e. name, addresses, liv-
ing habits, .etc) over a short period of time. By combining these
queries, adversaries may easily discover an individual’s identity,
and it is difficult to foresee all possible combinations that can lead
to privacy breaches. For instance, Table 1 illustrates a subset of an
Internet user Alice’s search log (note: the user-IDs can be deter-
mined by cookies, IP addresses or user accounts; we ignore query
time and item rank of search logs in this paper). Although the real
user-ID has been replaced by the pseudonymous ID 000101, the
adversaries can still identify Alice’s search log if they have some
background knowledge on Alice (i.e. her address, she bought a
second-hand Honda car via autotrader recently, she likes pizza),
and thus learn more sensitive information (i.e. pregnancy test) from
Alice’s complete search log. Second, search logs are sparse and
highly-dimensional, thus it is more difficult to guarantee rigorous
privacy without sacrificing too much utility.
Table 1: An Example of Search Logs
User-ID Query URL Count
000101 1 Washington Avenue maps.google.com 5
Honda www.honda.com 2
autotrader www.autotrader.com 4
pizza www.pizzahut.com 1
pregnancy test www.medicinenet.com 1
... ... ...
In recent years, several search log anonymization techniques have
been proposed in the literature to resolve the above problems [20,
5, 17, 14, 15, 19, 23]. Several anonymity models have been pro-
posed for this domain along with corresponding anonymization al-
gorithms. However, their basic premise is simply that the algorithm
must satisfy the privacy requirements without worrying about the
tradeoff between privacy and utility. Ideally, what is needed is a
strategy that can maximize the utility while satisfying a given pri-
vacy requirement. To our knowledge, there is little work focusing
on this challenging and practical problem. In this paper, we take the
first step towards tackling this problem in the domain of search log
anonymization by formulating utility-maximizing problems while
ensuring a rigorous privacy standard.
1.1 Contribution
Given a particular privacy requirement, the utility-maximizing
problem requires finding a way to anonymize search logs in a man-
ner that satisfies the privacy standard and simultaneously achieves
the optimal output utility. This requires deciding on a suitable pri-
vacy requirement as well as appropriate data utility measure. While
several different anonymity models have been proposed in the lit-
erature, in this paper, we utilizes the robust privacy definition of
differential privacy [7] (which lowers the privacy breach risk even
if the adversaries hold arbitrary prior knowledge). We also define
several different notions of utility and propose differentially private
sanitization methods that can maximize the output utility. Thus, the
main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• The differentially private randomization in prior work (Ko-
rolova et al.[19] and Götz et al.[10]) ensures differential pri-
vacy by adding Laplacian noise to the aggregated query and
clicked url counts. However, such approaches break the as-
sociation between distinct query-url pairs in the output since
all the user-IDs have been removed, which might be useful
in only a few applications. Therefore, we propose differen-
tially private algorithms based on a different randomization
strategy: sample user-IDs for every click-through query-url
pairs using multinomial distribution, which preserves user-
IDs. This, to our knowledge, is the first randomization strat-
egy to generate output with identical schema as the input
search log. Thus, the sanitized search log can be analyzed
in exactly the same fashion and for the same purpose as the
input.
• Within our approach, the randomization algorithm also en-
sures the utility-maximized output that is still differentially
private. To do this, we formally define the utility-maximizing
problem: find an optimal sanitization that maximizes the out-
put utility while satisfying differential privacy. Specifically,
for quantifying the output utility, we define three different
utility notions (measuring the utility of frequent click-through
query-url pairs, the query-url pair diversity, etc.) that could
benefit different applications (essentially, any utility measure
can be coupled into our differentially private sanitization by
replacing the utility objective function). We also prove that
our sanitization satisfies differential privacy;
• We transform the utility-maximizing problems into standard
optimization problems. We can now leverage prior devel-
oped effective solvers and adapt them to our problem. We
experimentally validate the utility using real data sets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 reviews the related literature. In Section 3, we present our pri-
vacy model and the sanitization process. Section 4 introduces the
constraints that guarantee privacy protection. We then formulate
three different utility-maximizing problems and show that the cor-
responding sanitization methods are differentially private in Sec-
tion 5. Section 6 evaluates the output utility of the proposed saniti-
zation approaches. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
2.1 Search Log Anonymization
Following the AOL search log incident, there has been some
work on user privacy issues related to privately publishing search
logs. Adar [1] proposes a secret sharing scheme where a query
must appear at least t times before it can be decoded. It may poten-
tially remove too many harmless queries, thus reducing data utility.
Kumar et al. [20] propose an approach that tokenizes each query tu-
ple and hashes the corresponding search log identifiers. However,
inversion cannot be done using just the token frequencies. Also,
serious leaks are possible even when the order of tokens is hidden.
More recently, some anonymization models [19, 14, 15, 23] have
been developed for search log release. He et al. [14], Hong et
al. [15] and Liu et al. [23] anonymized search logs based on k-
anonymity which is not as rigorous as differential privacy [10]. Ko-
rolova et al. [19] first applied the rigorous privacy notion – differen-
tial privacy to search log release by adding Laplacian noise. How-
ever, several shortcomings can be discovered in this work. First,
the released result of this is the statistical information of queries
and clicks where all users’ search queries and clicks are aggregated
together (without individual attribution). The data utility might be
greatly reduced since the association between query-url pairs has
been removed (the published data in Götz et al. [10] also suffers
this constraint). With the released data, we cannot develop person-
alized query suggestion or recommendation for search engines, and
also, we cannot carry out human behavior research since the output
data do not include the information that any two queries belong to
the same user. Second, as addressed by Götz et al. [10], the relaxed
differential privacy notion in [19] is not sufficiently strong. Third,
the utility in [19] is merely evaluated but not shown to be maxi-
mized. Adding Laplacian noise to the counts of selected queries
and urls is straightforward and we cannot directly model optimiza-
tion problems to maximize the output utility. Alternatively, our pa-
per is to seek the maximum output utility for a novel differentially
private search log sanitization mechanism which generate outputs
with the identical schema as the original search log.
Furthermore, Götz et al. [10] analyzes algorithms of publishing
frequent keywords, queries and clicks in search logs and conducts
a comparison w.r.t. two relaxations of ǫ-differential privacy (re-
laxations are indispensable in search log publishing). Our work
utilizes the stronger relaxation of ǫ-differential privacy – proba-
bilistic differential privacy. Since we explore the optimal utility
in our differentially private sanitization mechanism which outputs
search logs rather than the results of counting queries and clicked
urls over the search log, our work has a completely different focus,
compared with their work [10].
2.2 Differential Privacy
In the context of relational data anonymization, Dwork et al.[6,
7] have proposed the rigorous privacy definition of differential pri-
vacy: a randomized algorithm is differentially private if for any pair
of neighboring inputs, the probability of generating the same out-
put, is within a small multiple of each other. This means that for any
two datasets which are close to one another, a differentially private
algorithm will behave approximately the same on both data sets.
This notion provides sufficient privacy protection for users regard-
less of the prior knowledge possessed by the adversaries. This has
been extended to data release in various different contexts besides
search logs (i.e. contingency tables, graph data). Specifically, Xiao
et al. [27] introduced a data publishing technique which ensures
ǫ-differential privacy while providing accurate answers for range-
count queries. Hay et al. [13] presented an efficient algorithm for
releasing a provably private estimate of the degree distribution of
a network where it also satisfies the differential privacy. McSh-
erry et al. [25] solved the problem of producing recommendations
from collective user behavior while providing differential privacy
for users. Our work follows the same line of research.
2.3 Tradeoff between Privacy and Utility
For any data modification based anonymization technique, a trade-
off between privacy and utility naturally holds. Li et al. [22] an-
alyzed the fundamental characteristics of privacy and utility, and
proposed a tradeoff framework for discussing privacy and utility.
In microdata disclosure, Bayardo et al. [4] and LeFevre et al. [21]
raised the optimal k-anonymity and the optimal multidimensional
anonymization problem respectively. Kifer et al. [18] presented a
way to gain additional utility from k-anonymous and l-diverse ta-
bles. Recently, Ghosh et al. [8] introduced a utility maximizing
mechanism for releasing a statistical database. However, there is
little work on this topic in the context of differential privacy guar-
anteed search log release. To our knowledge, we takes a first step
towards addressing this deficiency.
3. MODEL
3.1 Differential Privacy
Our objective is to privately sanitize the input search logs that
includes pseudonymous user-IDs, search queries, clicked urls and
the counts of every user’s click-through query-url pairs. Hence,
we ensure that the output has the identical schema as the input:
every single tuple in the output includes a pseudonymous user-ID,
a click-through query-url pair and its count for this user.
We consider two search logs to be neighbors if they differ by an
arbitrary user’s (all) query tuples. Hence, we define every user’s all
query tuples in a search log D as its user log.
DEFINITION 1. (USER LOG Ak) Given a search log D, we
denote each user sk’s user log Ak as all his/her query tuples in
D, where every single tuple [sk, qi, uj , cijk] ∈ Ak includes a
pseudonymous user-ID (sk), a query (qi), a url (uj) and the count
(cijk) of query-url pair (qi, uj) belonging to user sk.
Clearly, every search log D consists of numerous individual user
logs (D = ⋃∀sk∈D Ak). Given two neighboring input search logs
D and D′ (w.o.l.g, D = D′ + Ak), ensuring ǫ-differential privacy
for all the outputs might be impossible: for any output O including
items in D but not in D′ (such as user-ID sk), the probability that
generating O from D′ is zero but from D is non-zero, hence the
ratio between the probabilities cannot be bounded by eǫ (due to a
zero denominator). We thus adopt the following relaxed notion of
differential privacy (using our notations):
DEFINITION 2. ((ǫ, δ)-PROBABILISTIC DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
[24, 10]) A randomization algorithmR satisfies (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic
differential privacy if for any input search log D, we can divide the
output space Ω into two sets Ω1, Ω2 such that
(1) Pr[R(D) ∈ Ω1] ≤ δ, and
for D’s all neighboring search logs D′ and for any output O ∈ Ω2:
(2) Pr[R(D)=O]
Pr[R(D′)=O]
≤ eǫ and Pr[R(D
′)=O]
Pr[R(D)=O]
≤ eǫ.
The above probabilistic differential privacy ensures that R satis-
fies ǫ-differential privacy with high probability (no less than 1− δ)
[10]. In this definition, the set Ω1 includes all privacy-breaching
outputs for ǫ-differential privacy where the probability of gener-
ating such outputs is bounded by δ. Specifically in our sanitiza-
tion (w.o.l.g. D = D′ + Ak), since we retain user IDs in the
output and D′ does not contain sk, we can only consider Ω1 as
the output space where all outputs in Ω1 include user-ID sk (be-
cause ǫ-differential privacy cannot be achieved when D′, D dif-
fering in user sk’s user log Ak and the output O including sk).
Hence, the probability Pr[R(D) ∈ Ω1] should be no greater than
δ (the probability of sk existing in the overall output space Ω should
be bounded by δ). Moreover, for any output O ∈ Ω2, two ratios
should be bounded by eǫ for achieving ǫ-differential privacy. Def-
inition 2 has been proven to be stronger than the privacy notion of
Korolova et al.’s work [19] (indistinguishability differential privacy
[6]) by Götz et al.[10] (as also shown in Section 4.3).
All the sanitization methods addressed in this paper are required
to satisfy this robust and rigorous privacy definition. No matter
how much prior knowledge is owned by adversaries, we can lower
the privacy risk by bounding the probabilities that any arbitrary two
neighboring inputs produce any possible output.
3.2 Search Log Sanitization Process
With a rigorous privacy standard (Definition 2), our goal is to
maximize the retained utility for the sanitized search logs. We now
illustrate our search log sanitization process that integrates the sat-
isfaction of differential privacy and utility maximization.
The most sensitive values in search logs are the click-through in-
formation. Sometimes search queries may be more sensitive than
the clicked urls in search logs (i.e. query “diabetes medicine” and
click “www.walmart.com”), or vice versa (i.e. query “medicine”
and click “www.cancer.gov”). We thus consider each distinct click-
through query-url pair (simply denoted as query-url pair) as a com-
bination of the sensitive values in the search logs. In our privacy
model, Definition 2 ensures that adding any user’s all search infor-
mation (user-ID, query-url pairs and the counts) in the input does
not cause any additional risk.
Table 2 presents some frequently used notations in our model:
we denote cij as the input count of any query-url pair (qi, uj) and
the set of these counts {∀cij} constitutes the input query-url his-
togram. Similarly, xij represents the output count of (qi, uj) and
the set of these counts x = {∀xij} forms the output query-url his-
togram. Finally, the output counts of all triplets (qi, uj , sk) form
the output query-url-user histogram which is randomly sampled
(the sampling process will be given later on). Similarly, the deter-
ministic counts of all triplets (qi, uj , sk) in the input form the input
query-url-user histogram.
Table 2: Frequently Used Notations
(qi, uj) an arbitrary query-url pair in the input/output
(qi, uj , sk) any user sk’s arbitrary query-url pair (qi, uj)
cij the total count of (qi, uj) in the input
cijk the count of triplet (qi, uj , sk) in the input
xij the total count of (qi, uj) in the output
(variable) (in the optimal solution: x∗ij )
xijk (random the count of triplet (qi, uj , sk) in a sample output (x∗ijk
variable) is the count of (qi, uj , sk) if sampling with x∗ij trials)
Algorithm 1 illustrates two steps of our sanitization. We first
compute the optimal output counts for all the query-url pairs in the
input search log D, and then generate the output O by sampling
user-IDs for each of them with multinomial distribution [2] (the de-
tails of this multinomial sampling are given later on). More specifi-
cally, the algorithm can be guaranteed to be differentially private by
some constraints for the output counts of all query-url pairs {∀xij}
(we can derive the constraints from the randomization, as shown
in Section 4). Meanwhile, the output utility can be maximized by
the utility objective function (some options are given in Section 5).
Thus, we can formulate the utility-maximizing problem to com-
pute the optimal output counts of all query-url pairs for the random
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Figure 1: An Example of the Sanitization Algorithm
sampling (the optimal solution x∗ = {∀x∗ij} achieves the optimal
output utility and also satisfies differential privacy constraints).
Algorithm 1 Sanitization Algorithm
Input: search log D and differential privacy parameters (ǫ, δ)
Output: sanitized search log O
1: Compute the Optimal Output Counts for all query-url pairs in the
search log: {∀(qi, uj) ∈ D,x∗ij}.
/*** solve an optimization problem: define a utility objective function
w.r.t. the output counts {∀xij} while {∀xij} subject to some con-
straints that ensures differential privacy for this algorithm. (the optimal
solution is {∀x∗ij}) ***/
2: Generate the Output O: sampling user-IDs for every query-url pair
(qi, uj) with x∗ij times multinomial trials (the probability of every
sampled outcome in one trial is given by the input D).
Figure 1 shows an example of Algorithm 1, particularly the multi-
nomial sampling after computing the optimal output counts of all
query-url pairs {∀x∗ij} (assume that {0, 3, 20, 0, 4} in the example
is the optimal solution of an optimization problem that includes a
utility objective and some constraints ensuring differential privacy).
Therefore, our multinomial sampling has following properties:
1. The number of multinomial trials for (qi, uj)’s user-ID sam-
pling is given as x∗ij (optimal solution x∗ = {∀x∗ij}).
2. In every multinomial trial for any query-url pair (qi, uj),
the probability that any user-ID sk is sampled, is cijk/cij .
Specifically, i.e. “car price, kbb.com” in Figure 1, the proba-
bility that user 082 is sampled is 2
0+2+5
. However, the prob-
ability that user 081 is sampled for this query-url pair is 0. In
addition, the expected value of every random variable xijk
can be derived as E(xijk) = xij ·
cijk
cij
. Thus, given an
output count x∗ij (optimal) for any query-url pair (qi, uj),
the shape of the input/output query-url-user histograms w.r.t.
only query-url pair (qi, uj) (illustrating the individual counts
of (qi, uj) held by distinct users) should be analogous (this is
guaranteed by multinomial distribution). i.e. the input/output
query-url-user histogram w.r.t. “google, google.com”, even
if the output count x∗ij = 20 < cij = 15+7+17 = 39, the
shape of histograms {8, 3, 9} (in a randomized output, see
Figure 1(b)) and {15, 7, 17} (in the input) is similar.
3. If ∀(qi, uj), the Input Support (denoted as cij/
∑
∀(qi,uj)
cij ),
is close to the Output Support (denoted as xij/
∑
∀(qi,uj)
xij),
the shape of the output query-url histogram can be maxi-
mally preserved. At this time, after sampling user-IDs with
the above output counts of all query-url pairs (or called out-
put query-url histogram), the shape of the output query-url-
user histogram can be maximally preserved as well.
Actually, one of our utility-maximizing problems is to seek
the optimal output utility that minimizes the sum of the sup-
port distances for all frequent query-url pairs (see the defi-
nition and details in Section 5.2, if pursuing the minimum
sum of support distances for all query-url pairs, we can lower
the minimum support threshold). Thus, once the sum of the
support distances are minimized (utility-maximizing prob-
lem can do so, i.e. it figures out that the distance between
{∀
xij∑
xij
} = {0, 3
27
, 20
27
, 0, 4
27
} and {∀ cij∑
cij
} = { 2+0+0
53
,
3+0+1
53
, 15+7+17
53
,
0+0+1
53
,
0+2+5
53
} is minimized while sat-
isfying some privacy guarantee constraints), the shape of the
input/output query-url-user histograms can be analogous (i.e.
see the counts in the left table of Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(b)).
To sum up, if we compute the output count of every query-url
pair x = {∀xij} by solving an optimization problem (for vari-
ables x = {∀xij}) that maximizes the output utility and also en-
sures differential privacy for the sanitization algorithm, the output
with optimal utility can be generated by sampling user-IDs for all
the query-url pairs (the schema of Input/Output is indeed identical
since we can sort the output by the sampled user-IDs, as shown in
Figure 1(b) where the association between query-url pairs and the
shape of query-url-user histogram can be preserved).
4. PRIVACY GUARANTEE CONDITIONS
Assume that R is a sanitization algorithm that samples user-IDs
for every query-url pair (qi, uj) with its total output count xij .
Since the sampling procedures for all query-url pairs are indepen-
dent, for any input D ({∀cijk} is given) and a possible output O
({∀xijk} is also given), the probability Pr[R(D) = O] can be
computed in terms of the probability mass function of multinomial
distribution [2]:
Pr[R(D) = O] =
∏
∀(qi,uj)∈O
[xij ! ·
∏
∀sk∈D
(cijk/cij)
xijk
xijk!
] (1)
Indeed, Pr[R(D) = O] is determined by xij and {∀sk ∈
D,
cijk
cij
and xijk}. Given input D, {∀sk,
cijk
cij
} are constants.
Hence, if ∀(qi, uj) ∈ D, the output count xij is determined, we
can compute the probability Pr[R(D) = O] for any output O ∈ Ω
(∀xijk are fixed in O). Therefore, given any pair of neighboring in-
puts D and D′ that differ in one user log, bounding the probabilities
per Definition 2 for a divided output space Ω can be transformed
to the problem: determining a feasible solution x = {∀xij} in the
output that satisfies all the probability bounding conditions in Def-
inition 2 for an output space split Ω = Ω1 ∪ Ω2. Using this we
can formulate the constraints (satisfying differential privacy) for
variables: the counts of all query-url pairs x = {∀xij} in all the
possible outputs O ∈ Ω.
Without loss of generality, we let D = D′ + Ak where D and
D′ differ in an arbitrary user sk’s user log Ak. Thus, we first derive
the probabilities in Definition 2 for all O in the output space Ω, and
then deduce the constraints for satisfying differential privacy.
4.1 Probabilities in Definition 2
Due to D = D′ +Ak, the user-ID sk might be sampled into the
output O if starting from D. Thus, for all outputs O which con-
tain sk, we have Pr[R(D′) = O] = 0 (since sk /∈ D′). Recall
that, given Ak = D −D′ (or Ak = D′ −D), we can only divide
the output space Ω into two sets Ω1 and Ω2 as: (1) every output
O in Ω1 includes sk; (2) every output O in Ω2 does not include
sk, because Ω1 should includes all the exceptional outputs that vi-
olates ǫ-differential privacy. We thus bound the probabilities per
Definition 2 for the above output space split of any two neighbor-
ing inputs (∀O ∈ Ω1, user-ID sk ∈ O and sk /∈ Ω2) to achieve
differential privacy.
4.1.1 for all O ∈ Ω1
Since ∀O ∈ Ω1 where sk ∈ O, we have Pr[R(D′) = O] = 0.
Thus, the probability Pr[R(D′) ∈ Ω1] is also equal to 0. We now
compute the probability Pr[R(D) ∈ Ω1].
Specifically, to generate any possible output O including user-
ID sk from D, the probability Pr[R(D) = O] (where O ∈ Ω1)
is equal to the probability that “sk is sampled at least once in the
multinomial sampling process of all the query-url pairs inAk”. For
every query-url pair (qi, uj) ∈ Ak, if its total output count in the
sampling is xij , the probability that sk is not sampled in a single
multinomial trial (a user-ID in D except sk is sampled) is cij−cijkcij
simply because user sk holds (qi, uj) with the count cijk and the
total count of (qi, uj) is cij in the input D. Since ∀(qi, uj) ∈ Ak
may lead to that sk being sampled and the multinomial sampling
for every query-url pair (qi, uj) includes xij independent trials,
we have Pr[sk is not sampled] =
∏
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
(
cij−cijk
cij
)xij . Fi-
nally, we can obtain the probability that sk is sampled at least once:
Pr[sk is sampled] = 1−
∏
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
(
cij−cijk
cij
)xij .
Thus, we can derive the probability Pr[R(D) ∈ Ω1] as below:
Pr[R(D) ∈ Ω1] = 1−
∏
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
(
cij − cijk
cij
)xij (2)
One important issue is worth noting in multinomial sampling.
For any query-url pair (qi, uj) ∈ Ak where cijk = cij ((qi, uj) is
unique and only belongs to user sk), if its output count xij > 0, the
probability Pr[R(D) ∈ Ω1] should be equal to 1 which cannot be
bounded. Therefore, we let xij = 0 for this case and all the unique
query-url pairs in the input should be removed.
4.1.2 for all O ∈ Ω2
For any output O ∈ Ω2, we discuss the ratios Pr[R(D)=O]Pr[R(D′)=O] and
Pr[R(D′)=O]
Pr[R(D)=O]
(since O does not include sk, we have Pr[R(D) =
O] > 0 and Pr[R(D′) = O] > 0).
Intuitively, for all query-url pairs that belong to both Ak and
D′, sampling user-IDs from D involves an additional candidate sk
(but sk /∈ O) compared with sampling user-IDs from D′. We thus
have Pr[R(D)=O]
Pr[R(D′)=O]
≤ 1 and Pr[R(D
′)=O]
Pr[R(D)=O]
≥ 1. Since the ratio
Pr[R(D)=O]
Pr[R(D′)=O]
is bounded by 1 (and obviously eǫ), we only need to
derive the ratio Pr[R(D
′)=O]
Pr[R(D)=O]
.
As mentioned in Section 4.1.1, all the query-url pairs in D (and
Ak) but not in D′ should be not be retained in the output. Thus,
to generate O from D, we only sample user-IDs for the common
query-url pairs of D and D′. Two categories of common query-url
pairs can be identified in D′ (D′ ⊂ D here): (1) query-url pairs in
D′ but not in Ak (2) query-url pairs in D′ and also in Ak.
In the first category, ∀(qi, uj) in D′ but not in Ak, the probabili-
ties of sampling user-IDs for (qi, uj) from D and D′ are equivalent
because the query-url-user histogram w.r.t. these query-url pairs in
D and D′ is identical. We denote the ratio of these two probabili-
ties as Pr[R(D
′)=O]
Pr[R(D)=O]
(ij) that is equal to 1.
In the second category, ∀(qi, uj) in D′ and also in Ak, we can
consider every sampled user-ID in the process of R(D) → O into
two cases: “sk is sampled or not”. In every multinomial trial for
(qi, uj), the probability of sampling sk is
cijk
cij
while the proba-
bility of sampling another user-ID in D (also in D′) is 1 − cijk
cij
.
Since the number of (qi, uj) in the output is xij (xij times inde-
pendent trials), we have ratio Pr[R(D′)=O]
Pr[R(D)=O]
(ij)= 1
(1−
cijk
cij
)
xij
=
(
cij
cij−cijk
)xij (since O does not contain sk, sk should not be sam-
pled in xij times independent trials when generating O from D).
In sum, to generate any output O ∈ Ω2 from D and D′ respec-
tively, it is independent to sample user-IDs for all the above two
categories of query-url pairs. Thus, ∀O ∈ Ω2, Pr[R(D
′)=O]
Pr[R(D)=O]
=∏
∀(qi,uj)∈D
′
Pr[R(D′)=O]
Pr[R(D)=O]
(ij). Since ∀(qi, uj) ∈ D′ but /∈ Ak,
Pr[R(D′)=D]
Pr[R(D)=D]
(ij) = 1, we have ∀O ∈ Ω2:
Pr[R(D′) = O]
Pr[R(D) = O]
=
∏
∀(qi,uj)∈D
′∩Ak
(
cij
cij − cijk
)xij (3)
4.2 Differential Privacy Constraints
(ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy (Definition 2) demands:
for any input D, Pr[R(D) ∈ Ω1] ≤ δ; for D’s arbitrary neigh-
boring input D′ and ∀O ∈ Ω2, 1/eǫ ≤ Pr[R(D)=O]Pr[R(D′)=O] ≤ e
ǫ
. We
now show that proving the randomization algorithm to be (ǫ, δ)-
probabilistic differentially private as per Definition 2 is equivalent
to ensuring that the output counts of all query-url pairs satisfy a set
of conditions. Theorem 1 is proven in Appendix A.
THEOREM 1. The randomization algorithm R achieves (ǫ, δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy if for any input search log D, the
output counts of query-url pairs x = {∀(qi, uj) ∈ D, xij} satisfy:
1. if ∃ triplet (qi, uj , sk) ∈ D such that cijk = cij , then xij =
0 (do not output unique query-url pairs);
2. for all Ak ⊂ D: ∏∀(qi,uj)∈Ak( cijcij−cijk )xij ≤ eǫ;
3. for all Ak ⊂ D: 1−∏∀(qi,uj)∈Ak( cij−cijkcij )xij ≤ δ.
As a result, we can utilize these conditions to formulate utility-
maximizing problems in our differentially private search log san-
itization. Specifically, we can implement Condition 1 while pre-
processing the input search log (removing all the unique query-url
pairs), and regard Condition 2 and 3 as Differential Privacy Con-
straints in the sanitization. As soon as they are satisfied, the sani-
tization should be (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential private for every
pair of neighboring search logs that differs in only one user log.
Note that while our multinomial sampling process is differen-
tially private, the computation of the counts (x∗ = {∀x∗ij}) is not
necessarily so. To make the whole (end-to-end) sanitization differ-
entially private, we must ensure that the count computation step is
also differentially private. One simple way to do this is to use the
generic procedure of adding Laplacian noise to the counts derived
from the optimization model (x∗ = {∀x∗ij}). Since the count com-
putation can be viewed as a query over the input database, adding
Laplacian noise will make the computation differentially private.
Specifically, similar to Korolova et al. [19], if the count dif-
ferences of every query-url pair (qi, uj) in the optimal solutions
derived from two neighboring inputs (D,D′) are bounded by a
constant d, computing optimal counts can be guaranteed to be ǫ′-
differentially private [19] (ǫ′ is the parameter of ensuring differen-
tial privacy for such step) by adding Laplacian noise to the optimal
count of every query-url pair: ∀(qi, uj), x∗ij ← x∗ij + Lap(d/ǫ′).
Essentially, given d, we can simply bound the difference of every
query-url pair’s optimal count (computed from any two neighbor-
ing inputs D,D′) by executing the following preprocessing proce-
dure for every user log Ak in the input database (D or D′):
1. formulate two utility-maximizing problems (pick the same
option as the following sanitization) with neighboring inputs
D and D − Ak (or D′ and D′ − Ak if D′ is the input) re-
spectively, and solve them.
2. if the count difference of any query-url pair in both optimal
solutions is greater than d, remove Ak from D (or D′) 1.
If applying the above preprocessing procedure to any two neigh-
boring inputs D and D′, and computing the optimal output counts
with the updated D and D′, the difference of every query-url pair’s
optimal count can be bounded by d. Thus, adding noise Lap(d/ǫ′)
can ensure ǫ′-differential privacy [19] for the step of computing
optimal counts in Algorithm 1. While adding noise may distort the
optimality to some extent, this is the price of guaranteeing complete
differential privacy. Since adding Laplacian noise is a well-studied
generic approach, we do not discuss this differential privacy guar-
antee due to space limitation, and the sanitization/randomization
algorithm refers to the sampling process in this paper.
4.3 Indistinguishability Differential Privacy
Recall that in Section 3.1, we have noted that probabilistic dif-
ferential privacy [24, 10] provides stronger privacy guarantee than
indistinguishability differential privacy [6, 19]. Particularly, the
probabilistic differential privacy notion has following property:
PROPOSITION 1. Probabilistic differential privacy implies in-
distinguishability differential privacy in our search log sanitiza-
tion: if all the conditions in Definition 2 are satisfied with parame-
ters (ǫ, δ), the following two inequalities also hold:
1. Pr[R(D′) ∈ Ô] ≤ eǫ · Pr[R(D) ∈ Ô] + δ;
1The optimization problems result from any two neighboring in-
puts (especially the large neighboring inputs) generate similar op-
timal solutions. Thus, if d is not too small, the output count differ-
ence can be bounded by d. Otherwise, if d is required to be suffi-
ciently small (for reducing sensitivity/noise), we remove some user
logs (that cause large differences in two optimal solutions). This
allows us to trade off utility for end-to-end differential privacy.
2. Pr[R(D) ∈ Ô] ≤ eǫ · Pr[R(D′) ∈ Ô] + δ.
where Ô is an arbitrary set of possible outputs and Ô ⊆ Ω.
Götz et al. prove Proposition 1 and show that the converse of
it does not hold in [10] (The proof of Proposition 1 is also given
in Appendix B). Hence, satisfying Definition 2 with the differen-
tial privacy constraints (Theorem 1) provides more rigorous privacy
guarantee than the work of Korolova et al. [19].
5. UTILITY-MAXIMIZING PROBLEMS
While search logs consist of millions of queries and click-through
urls, from the perspective of utility, clearly, all are not equal. In-
deed, from an application perspective, only a small portion may be
useful with regards to a specific purpose. For instance, only the fre-
quent query-url pairs are useful for query recommendation. Hence,
different data usage purposes may result in different requirements
for extracting data from the original search log. To privately sani-
tize search logs while retaining maximal utility, we need to evaluate
the data utility according to the usage requirement. In this section,
we introduce three utility-maximizing problems with three differ-
ent utility definitions.
5.1 Maximizing the Output Size
Before formulating the utility-maximizing problems, we first present
the differential privacy constraints. As stated in Theorem 1, our
sanitization algorithm satisfies (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential pri-
vacy if three conditions for the output counts of all query-url pairs
are satisfied. Specifically, Condition 1 should be implemented in
the preprocessing step2 while Conditions 2 and 3 give two sets of
constraints for the output counts of all query-url pairs, x = {xij}:
s.t.


∀Ak ⊂ D,
∏
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
(
cij
cij−cijk
)xij ≤ eǫ
∀Ak ⊂ D, 1−
∏
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
(
cij−cijk
cij
)xij ≤ δ
∀xij ≥ 0 and xij is an integer
Intuitively, the differential privacy constraints can be transformed
into linear constraints: (constant tijk = cijcij−cijk ; each user log
Ak’s two constraints can be combined as min{ǫ, log 11−δ })
s.t.
{
∀Ak ⊂ D,
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
xij · log tijk ≤ min{ǫ, log
1
1−δ
}
∀xij ≥ 0 and xij is an integer
(4)
In the above differential privacy constraints (each user log gen-
erates a constraint): due to ∀tijk = cijcij−cijk > 1, the coefficient
of all the linear constraints ∀ log tijk should be greater than 0 (all
unique query-url pairs have been removed). Letting Mx ≤ b be
the above differential privacy constraints, all the elements in the
constraint matrix M are non-negative and all the elements in b are
equal to min{ǫ, log 1
1−δ
}. Thus, we have:
STATEMENT 1. Differential privacy constraints (Equation 4)
are always feasible and bounded.
We show the above property from the geometric perspective of
linear constraints. Specifically, linear constraints {Mx ≤ b, x ≥
0, b > 0} form a convex polytope, which is always feasible and
bounded if M, b ≥ 0 [26]. i.e. in Figure 2(a) (two differential
privacy constraints are generated by two user logs which includes
three distinct query-url pairs), the feasible region of {Mx ≤ b, x ≥
2For all unique query-url pairs, we let the output count be 0 (for
satisfying Condition 1 in Theorem 1).
0, b > 0} is formed as polytope OABCDE by two constraints
(the space below planes AFH and GCD). Similarly, in Figure 2(b)
(three differential privacy constraints are generated by three user
logs which includes two distinct query-url pairs), all the solutions
in the feasible region OABC (the region below AD, FC and EH)
satisfy all the differential privacy constraints. For more variables
and constraints, more hyperplanes would form the polytope that is
still feasible and bounded [26].
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Figure 2: Differential Privacy Constraints
One interesting point worth noting is that the size of the out-
put (the total number of all users’ query-url pairs in the output) is
bounded by the differential privacy constraints. If we regard the
output size
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D
xij as the utility objective function, we
can use the following problem to seek the optimal output utility:
max :
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D
xij
s.t.
{
∀Ak ⊂ D,
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
xij · log tijk ≤ min{ǫ, log
1
1−δ
}
∀xij ≥ 0 and xij is an integer
We define the above problem as “Output size Utility-Maximizing
Problem” (O-UMP). Since it is an integer linear programming (ILP)
problem, we can solve it using some standard method (such as
simplex algorithm) with linear relaxation [26] (the LP problem is
always feasible and bounded). After solving it (optimal solution
x∗ = {∀⌊x∗ij⌋}), for every (qi, uj), we sample user-IDs with ⌊x∗ij⌋
times multinomial trials (the input query-url-user histogram pro-
vides the probability of every sampled outcome in one trial). The
sanitization algorithm satisfies Definition 2 (Proof in Appendix D).
LEMMA 1. The O-UMP based sanitization algorithm satisfies
(ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy for any pairs of neighboring
input search logs.
Since the optimal solution x∗ = {∀x∗ij} satisfies the differential
privacy constraints, the randomization algorithm based on the lin-
ear relaxed solution should be also differentially private (∀⌊x∗ij⌋ ≤
x∗ij , thus ∀⌊x∗ij⌋ strictly satisfies the constraints Mx ≤ b where
M, b ≥ 0). Note that if we require adding Laplacian noise to
{∀x∗ij} to ensure differential privacy for the step of computing op-
timal counts, we cannot always guarantee that the noise-added op-
timal solution satisfies the differential privacy constraints, though
this is likely (since the mean of added Laplacian noise is 0). Mean-
while, since the amount of noise Lap(d/ǫ′) is directly propor-
tional to d (privacy parameter ǫ′ is fixed), d can be lowered to
the preferred value (reducing the sensitivity/amount of noise) to
gain closer approximation of strict end-to-end differential privacy.
These also apply to the following utility-maximizing problems.
5.2 Optimal Utility of Frequent query-url Pairs
Top frequent click-through pairs in search logs have better util-
ity [12] than abnormal query-url pairs for improving the quality of
search results or enforcing the search with recommendations and
suggestions. Retaining frequent query-url pairs in the sanitized
search logs can be a basic and practical goal of seeking the opti-
mal output utility in the sanitization. We denote this problem as
“Frequent query-url pair Utility-Maximizing Problem” (F-UMP).
First of all, we denote |D| as the size (the total number of query-
url pairs) of the input search log D. Thus, frequent query-url pairs
can be identified using its Support in D: given a minimum support
threshold s, if cij
|D|
≥ s, then (qi, uj) is a frequent click-through
query-url pair in D. Since the support of a frequent query-url pair
explicitly indicates its importance in the search log, the support
of all the frequent query-url pairs should be preserved as much as
possible. In other words, the support of every frequent query-url
pair in the output O should be close to its support in the input D
(|D| does not include the number of unique query-url pairs which
should be removed in the preprocessing step).
Thus, we can define the objective function as minimizing the
sum of support distances for all the “frequent query-url pairs” in
the input search log D:
min :
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D where
cij
|D|
≥s
||
xij
|O|
−
cij
|D|
|| (5)
where |O| =
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D
xij is the size of the output O.
With this objective, we formulate the F-UMP using the differen-
tial privacy constraints as below:
min :
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D where
cij
|D|
≥s
||
xij
|O|
−
cij
|D|
||
s.t.


∀Ak ⊂ D,
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
xij · log tijk ≤ min{ǫ, log
1
1−δ
}∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D
xij = |O|
∀xij ≥ 0 and xij is an integer
Generally, since every query-url pair’s support in D and O are
two ratios, pursuing the minimized sum of support distances (our
objective in F-UMP) cannot always guarantee an output with good
frequent query-url pair utility (i.e. the number of all frequent query-
url pairs are very small, but the support of them are close to the orig-
inal one). Alternatively, we can specify a fixed output size |O| in
the sanitization and seek the optimal utility for the frequent query-
url pairs. Recall that O-UMP can generate the output with the max-
imum size for any input D and fixed parameters (ǫ, δ) (we denote
the maximum output size as λ). Thus, to preserve sufficient output
size, we can solve the F-UMP with a specified constant output size
|O| ∈ (0, λ].
STATEMENT 2. F-UMP can be considered as an integer linear
programming (ILP) problem if we fix the output size |O| as a con-
stant and standardize the absolute values in the objective function.
First, due to |O| =
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D
xij , if we specify the size of
the output in the sanitization, xij
|O|
−
cij
|D|
can be considered as lin-
ear. Second, we can transform the absolute values in the objective
function in a standard way:
1. create a new variable yij for every frequent query-url pair
∀(qi, uj) where cij|D| ≥ s: yij =
xij
|O|
−
cij
|D|
;
2. generate two new constraints for every yij : yij ≥ xij|O| −
cij
|D|
and yij ≥ cij|D| −
xij
|O|
.
As a result, F-UMP can be transformed into an integer linear
programming (ILP) problem as below:
min :
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D where
cij
|D|
≥s
yij
s.t.


∀Ak ⊂ D,
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
xij · log tijk ≤ min{ǫ, log
1
1−δ
}∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D
xij = |O|
∀(qi, uj) where
cij
|D|
≥ s, yij ≥
xij
|O|
−
cij
|D|
∀(qi, uj) where
cij
|D|
≥ s, yij ≥
cij
|D|
−
xij
|O|
∀xij ≥ 0 and xij is an integer
Similar to O-UMP, we can solve the above ILP problem using
some standard methods such as Simplex algorithm with linear re-
laxation [26] (if |O| is specified to be no greater than λ, the ILP
problem should be feasible and bounded).
Overall, in F-UMP based sanitization, we can specify an appro-
priate output size |O| ∈ (0, λ], solve the ILP problem (optimal
solution x∗ = {∀⌊x∗ij⌋}) and generate the optimal output utility:
the Input/Output Support of all the frequent query-url pairs tends
to be close (only counting the non-unique query-url pairs) and the
output size can be assured as well. Finally, we sample the output
with the optimal solution of F-UMP: for every (qi, uj) (either fre-
quent or infrequent), we sample user-IDs with ⌊x∗ij⌋ times multino-
mial trials (equally, the input query-url-user histogram provides the
probability of every sampled outcome in one trial). As discussed in
Section 3.2, the shape of query-url-user histogram can be preserved
in this problem based sanitization algorithm. Also, the sanitization
algorithm satisfies Definition 2 (Proof in Appendix D).
LEMMA 2. The F-UMP based sanitization algorithm satisfies
(ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy for any pairs of neighboring
input search logs.
5.3 Maximizing query-url Pair Diversity
Occasionally, more distinct query-url pairs exhibit better utility,
we can formulate the “Diversity Utility-Maximizing Problem” (D-
UMP) in search log sanitization. The diversity of search logs nor-
mally has two facts: the diversity of search queries and the diversity
of query-url pairs. Since we investigate the potential privacy breach
from every query-url pair (finer-grained than search queries), we
denote the diversity utility of search logs as the number of distinct
query-url pairs. (Indeed, we can also model search query diversity
maximizing problem in a similar way.)
In our sanitization, xij represents the count of query-url pair
(qi, uj) in the output O. To evaluate the diversity of the sanitized
search log O, we can introduce another variable yij for every xij .{
yij = 1, if xij > 0
yij = 0, if xij = 0 (6)
We thus define the utility function as max :
∑
yij . Moreover,
given a large constant H ≥ max{∀cij}, Equation 6 is guaranteed
to hold by the following inequalities:

∀(qi, uj), xij ≤ yij ·H
∀(qi, uj), xij ≥ yij
yij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀xij ≥ 0,H ≥ max{∀cij}
(7)
As a result, D-UMP can be formally defined as:
max :
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D
yij
s.t.


∀Ak ⊂ D,
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
xij · log tijk ≤ min{ǫ, log
1
1−δ
}
∀(qi, uj) ∈ D,xij ≤ yij ·H
∀(qi, uj) ∈ D,xij ≥ yij
H ≥ max{∀cij}, ∀xij ≥ 0 and is an integer, yij ∈ {0, 1}
Essentially, letting ∀xij ∈ {0, 1} and xij = yij , the above
mixed integer programming (MIP) problem can be transformed to
a simplified binary integer programming (BIP) problem (see Equa-
tion 8). Both problems have the same optimal solution for variables
y = {∀yij}. (We prove Theorem 2 in Appendix C)
THEOREM 2. The optimal solution y∗ = {∀y∗ij} of the BIP
problem is equivalent to the values {∀y∗ij} in the optimal solution
{x∗, y∗} = {∀x∗ij ,∀y
∗
ij} of the MIP problem.
max :
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D
yij
s.t.
{
∀Ak ⊂ D,
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
yij log tijk ≤ min{ǫ, log
1
1−δ
}
H ≥ max{cij},∀yij ∈ {0, 1}
(8)
After solving the simpler BIP problem rather than the MIP prob-
lem (both problems are feasible), we thus let ∀(qi, uj) ∈ D,xij =
yij ∈ {0, 1} be the optimal solution of D-UMP (sampling user-IDs
in only one trial for every query-url pair in the output. Similarly,
the input query-url-user histogram provides the probability of every
sampled outcome in one trial).
However, both BIP and MIP problem are NP-hard [26]. For
large-scale D-UMP, we propose an effective and efficient heuris-
tic algorithm to solve the BIP problem in Algorithm 2. It seeks an
approximate optimal value for the BIP problem. We iteratively re-
move sensitive query-url pairs (let yij = 0 if yij has a maximum
positive coefficient tijk in the sparse constraint matrix). We elim-
inate these query-url pairs since they belong to a certain user with
the highest percent in the count histogram of the triplets query-url-
user (sensitive to the corresponding user. i.e. if user sk holds 90%
of (qi, uj), tijk should be large). The algorithm terminates until all
the differential privacy constraints are satisfied.
Algorithm 2 Sensitive query-url Pair Eliminating (SPE) Heuristic
Input: search log D and differential privacy parameters (ǫ, δ)
Output: optimal solution for D-UMP y∗ = {∀y∗ij}
1: remove all the unique query-url pairs from D (preprocessing).
2: for every (qi, uj) ∈ D do
3: yij ← 1.
4: while true do
5: find the maximum tijk = cijcij−cijk from the constraint matrix.
6: let yij ← 0 for the maximum tijk .
7: if ∀Ak,
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
yij log tijk ≤ min{ǫ, log
1
1−δ
} then
8: break
9: return y∗ = {∀y∗ij}.
The sanitization algorithm based on D-UMP also satisfies Defi-
nition 2. (Proof in Appendix D)
LEMMA 3. The D-UMP based sanitization algorithm satisfies
(ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy for any pairs of neighboring
input search logs.
6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
6.1 Experiment Setup3
3Since the published search logs in [19] and [10] do not include
pseudonymous user-IDs for associating distinct query-url pairs in
every user’s search history, the utility of our sanitized search logs is
incomparable with their work. Moreover, since Laplacian noise has
been well evaluated in their work, we focus on testing the optimal
utility w.r.t. the output counts of all query-url pairs.
Dataset. In our experiments, we utilize the AOL real search log
[3, 11] to test our utility-maximizing problems. Our experimen-
tal dateset is extracted from one subset of AOL data. Specifically,
we randomly pick 2500 out of over 65000 user logs in the selected
AOL data. We remove all the unique query-url pairs (appear in only
one user log) from the selected dataset in our preprocessing step.
Thus, Table 3 presents the characteristics of the AOL dataset (only
collect the tuples with clicks), our randomly selected dataset and
the preprocessed dataset. 6043 distinct query-url pairs is held by
1980 users in the preprocessed dataset (since search logs which are
extremely diverse include large number of unique query-url pairs,
most of the existing work [19, 10] cannot maintain the entire output
diversity either). Thus, we have 6043 variables and 1980 differen-
tial privacy constraints in our UMPs.
Table 3: Characteristics of the Data Sets
AOL Exp. Preprocessed Dataset
Dataset Dataset (without unique pairs)
# of total tuples (size) 1,864,860 237,786 53,067 (|D|)
# of user logs 51,922 2,500 1,980 (Constraints)
# of distinct queries 583,084 83,130 4,971
# of distinct urls 373,837 82,076 4,289
# of query-url pairs 1,190,491 163,681 6,043 (Variables)
Experimental Parameters Setup. To observe the tuning of
differential privacy parameters (ǫ, δ), we let δ = {10−4, 10−3,
10−2, 10−1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8} and eǫ = {1.001, 1.01, 1.1, 1.4, 1.7, 2.0,
2.3} in all three utility-maximizing problems. Furthermore, F-
UMP requires two additional parameters: the minimum support s
and the output size |O| (|O| ≤ λ and λ is given as the optimal value
of O-UMP). We let s = { 1
100
,
1
250
,
1
500
,
1
750
,
1
1000
}. For every pair
of ǫ and δ, we compute λ in O-UMP and specify an appropriate
output size |O| in F-UMP.
Experimental Platform. All the experiments are performed on
an HP machine with Intel Core 2 Duo CPU 3GHz and 3G RAM
running Microsoft Windows XP Professional Operating system.
While solving D-UMP, we also submit the AMPL format of the
BIP problems to three NEOS solvers (qsopt_ex, scip and feaspump
[16]) running online in addition to locally running our heuristic.
6.2 Maximum Output Size λ
With the preprocessed dataset (|D| = 53067 as shown in Table
3), we can compute the maximum output size λ using O-UMP
for a given pair of differential privacy parameters (eǫ, δ). Table
4 presents the maximum output size (the optimal value of O-UMP)
for different pairs of (eǫ, δ) where O-UMP is solved by Matlab
function linprog. To generate the output O, we can sample user-
IDs for every query-url pair according to the optimal solution (6043
variables/query-url pairs). |O| can be maximized while the entire
process satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. We can obtain 7.08%-
26.2% of the original size with the given parameters. Due to the
highly diversity and sparseness of search log data, this percent of
output size is sufficient good for differential privacy guaranteed
sanitization algorithms.
Table 4: Maximum Output Size λ on eǫ and δ (|D| = 53067)
eǫδ 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 0.2 0.5 0.8
1.001 3759 4007 4007 4007 4007 4007 4007
1.01 3759 4007 4879 4879 4879 4879 4879
1.1 3759 4007 4891 8382 8382 8382 8382
1.4 3759 4007 4891 8874 10445 11419 11419
1.7 3759 4007 4891 8874 10445 12438 12438
2.0 3759 4007 4891 8874 10445 13088 13088
2.3 3759 4007 4891 8874 10445 13088 13901
6.3 Optimal Utility of Frequent query-url Pairs
Recall that F-UMP based sanitization generates outputs with the
minimum sum of the support distances of all the frequent query-
url pairs. Thus, we examine the maximum frequent query-url pairs
utility with three measures: the optimal value of F-UMP (minimum
sum of the support distances, see Equation 5), the Precision and
Recall of the frequent query-url pairs in the input/output. Precision
and Recall are defined as below:
Precision =
|S0 ∩ S|
|S|
, Recall =
|S0 ∩ S|
|S0|
(9)
where S0 and S denote the set of frequent query-url pairs in D
and O respectively, and | · | means the cardinality of the set. Specif-
ically, Precision is defined to evaluate the fraction of the frequent
query-url pairs in the output that are originally frequent in the in-
put with the same minimum support. Recall is defined to evaluate
the fraction of the frequent query-url pairs in the input that remains
frequent in the output with the same minimum support.
To evaluate the performance of F-UMP in differentially private
search log sanitization, we run two groups of experiments. First, we
fix the output size and the minimum support as: |O| = 3000 < λ
and s = 1
500
, and test the (measurement) results with different
pairs of (ǫ, δ). Second, we fix the differential privacy parameters
as: eǫ = 2, δ = 0.5 (λ = 13088, as shown in Table 4), and
test the results with different minimum support s and output size
|O|. One essential point worth noting is that the minimum sum of
support distances is an effective measure in the first group of ex-
periments because the minimum support s is fixed and the original
frequent query-url pairs in the input has been determined for all dif-
ferent pairs of ǫ and δ (thus the sum of the support distances for all
the frequent query-url pairs in the input is comparable). However,
in the second group, the set of original frequent query-url pairs is
varying for different s, hence the objective values of F-UMP is in-
comparable on a varying s. Therefore, we use the average of the
support distances for all the frequent query-url pairs in the input in
addition to the sum of them in the second group of experiments.
Interestingly, in all our F-UMP experiments, Precision is always
equal to 1, which means all the frequent query-url pairs in the out-
put are also frequent in the input with the same minimum support
s. This is quite reasonable: suppose that (qi, uj) is not a frequent
query-url pair in the input where cij
|D|
< s, if it is frequent in the
output where xij
|O|
≥ s, the solution of F-UMP must be not optimal
(reducing xij
|O|
to cij
|D|
might improve the objective value and does
not violate differential privacy constraints).
In the first group of experiments, Figure 3(a) and 3(b) demon-
strate the Recall and Sum of the Support Distances for all the fre-
quent query-url pairs in the input. Fixing δ, Recall increases as ǫ
increases until ǫ = log 1
1−δ
. Fixing ǫ ≥ log 1
1−δ
, Recall increases
as δ increases; fixing ǫ < log 1
1−δ
, Recall stays invariant even if
δ is increasing. By contrast, the sum of support distances has an
inverse increasing trend on varying ǫ and δ.
Table 5: Recall on Output Size |O| and Minimum Support s
(eǫ = 2, δ = 0.5, λ = 13088)
s|O| 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
1
1000
0.8873 0.8189 0.874 0.8661 0.8583 0.8346
1
750
0.8095 0.8762 0.8571 0.8476 0.8952 0.8667
1
500
0.9143 0.9143 0.9286 0.9143 0.8857 0.8714
1
250
0.9116 0.8529 0.8529 0.8529 0.8529 0.8235
1
100
0.933 0.8667 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7333
In the second group of experiments, Table 5 presents the Recall
on different pairs of outputs size and minimum support. As we
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Figure 3: F-UMP Performance
can see, over 80% of the frequent query-url pairs can be retained
in the output with fixing eǫ = 2 and δ = 0.5 (given more strict
eǫ and δ, 30% of them can be retained as shown in Figure 3(a)).
In addition, Table 6 illustrates the sum of support distances for all
frequent query-url pairs in the input (the same |O| and s as Table
5). Fixing s, the sum of support distances increases as the output
size increases (they are comparable due to fixed s). This fact is
true: given a fixed minimum support s, for the fixed set of frequent
query-url pairs in the input, it is easier to achieve the minimum
support without violating differential privacy constraints when |O|
is not too large (the ideal output count xij is |O| · cij|D| and the
output counts are bounded by privacy constraints, thus all frequent
query-url pairs ∀xij are likely to achieve |O| · cij|D| if |O| is small).
Finally, since the set of frequent query-url pairs varies for different
s, we compare the average support distance instead of the sum of
them for different s. As shown in Figure 3(c), the average support
distance decreases as the minimum support s increases (logarithmic
scale minimum support s). Therefore, the frequent query-url pairs
in the output is closer to them in the input if a larger minimum
support is given in the F-UMP.
Table 6: Sum of Freq. query-url Pair Support Distances on Out-
put Size |O| and Min. Support s (eǫ = 2, δ = 0.5, λ = 13088)
s|O| 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
1
1000
0.0551 0.085 0.1058 0.1279 0.1485 0.1785
1
750
0.0549 0.0854 0.1116 0.1271 0.1477 0.1767
1
500
0.0559 0.0865 0.1048 0.1247 0.1448 0.1716
1
250
0.0555 0.086 0.1043 0.1236 0.1393 0.161
1
100
0.0574 0.088 0.1063 0.1246 0.1392 0.1583
6.4 Maximum query-url Pair Diversity
6.4.1 D-UMP Performance
We now look at the performance of D-UMP (maximum diversity
utility). Figure 4 shows the percentage of retained query-url pairs
in the output with the same parameters (ǫ, δ) as F-UMP. The maxi-
mum query-url diversity has a similar increasing trend as the Recall
of F-UMP (Figure 3(a)). Moreover, the query-url diversity can be
retained as high as 30%. Note: the input has been preprocessed by
removing all the unique query-url pairs, and they are not counted
in the denominator of the ratio.
6.4.2 BIP Solver Comparison
Since D-UMP is an NP-hard problem, we introduced an effective
heuristic algorithm (Algorithm 2) for this binary integer program-
ming (BIP) problem with a sparse non-negative constraint matrix.
We now compare the performance of our Sensitive Pair Eliminating
heuristic (SPE) with some popular BIP solvers (Matlab bintprog
function, Neos qsopt_ex, Neos scip and Neos feaspump [16]).
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Figure 4: Maximum Diversity on (ǫ, δ) (Algorithm 2)
Table 7: Retained Diversity Utility of Different BIP Solvers
(a) eǫ = 2
BIP Solver δ 10−3 10−2 10−1 0.2 0.5 0.8
SPE (Heuristic) 12.8% 18.1% 26.0% 28.1% 29.5% 30.6%
Matlab bintprog 9.6% 15.2% 23.8% 26.8% 28.9% 29.5%
Neos qsopt_ex 9.6% 15.2% 23.4% 26.8% 29.5% 29.5%
Neos scip 9.5% 15.2% 23.7% 26.8% 29.5% 29.5%
Neos feaspump 9.6% 15.2% 25.8% 29.5% 30.3% 30.3%
(b) δ = 0.1
BIP Solver eǫ 1.01 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.3
SPE (Heuristic) 17.7% 25.7% 26.0% 26.0% 26.0% 26.0%
Matlab bintprog 14.6% 22.5% 23.8% 23.8% 23.8% 23.8%
Neos qsopt_ex 15.5% 22.5% 23.4% 23.4% 23.4% 23.4%
Neos scip 14.6% 21.4% 23.1% 23.1% 23.1% 23.1%
Neos feaspump 15.5% 25.8% 25.8% 25.8% 25.8% 25.8%
As shown in Table 7, we collected the maximum percent of re-
tained distinct query-url pairs using all the solvers with the same
experimental inputs. We observe that our heuristic algorithm per-
forms better than other solvers in most cases and the optimal values
by all the solvers have quite similar varying tendency. Specifically,
Algorithm 2 generates sanitized search logs with greater query-url
pair diversity than Matlab bintprog, NEOS qsopt and Neos scip.
NEOS feaspump performs slightly better than Algorithm 2 only
when (eǫ = 2, δ = 0.5) and (eǫ = 1.1, δ = 0.1).
Finally, we plot the computational costs for solving a typical D-
UMP by all solvers in Figure 5 (eǫ = 1.7, δ = 10−3)). Since
our Sensitive query-url Pair Eliminating (SPE) algorithm has the
complexity O(n2 logmn) (constraint matrix size: m × n), it out-
performs other solvers for our D-UMP in time complexity as well.
6.5 Difference of Input/Output Histograms
As described in Section 3.2, our multinomial sampling, partic-
ularly the F-UMP based sanitization can retain the shape of the
histograms in the output (generate similar count histograms for dis-
tinct triplets: query-url-user (qi, uj , sk)). We now examine this by
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(eǫ = 1.7, δ = 10−3, Logarithmic scale runtime)
comparing two histograms.
Specifically, we generate 10 randomized outputs according to
the optimal solution of F-UMP for two different output size |O| =
4000 and 6000 respectively (fixing eǫ = 2, δ = 0.5, s = 1/500),
and plot two bar plots in Figure 6: the X-axis varies from 0% to
100% while the Y-axis represents the average number of distinct
triplets (qi, uj , sk)4 whose difference ratio of the input/output his-
tograms (defined in Equation 10) equals the values in the X-axis. In
both Figure 6(a) and 6(b), the percent of most triplets (qi, uj , sk) in
the input/output varies within a tolerable bound (|O| = 4000, the
difference ratio of about 75% triplets is below 40%; |O| = 6000,
the difference ratio of about 90% triplets is below 40%).
DiffRatio(x∗ijk, cijk) = ||
x∗ijk/|O| − cijk/|D||
cijk/|D|
|| (10)
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have addressed the important practical problem
of retaining the maximum utility while the search log sanitization
satisfies differential privacy and generates outputs with the identical
schema as the original search log. As a necessary step, we have
defined three different notions of utility that are useful for various
applications. We have implemented our approach and validated it
on several real data sets.
We can extend our work in several directions. First, additional
notions of utility can be considered and corresponding optimization
models created. We also need to explore ways of combining differ-
ent utility notions to create a single joint objective. This would be
akin to a multi-objective optimization. Second, corresponding to
the utility-maximizing problem, one can similarly define the pri-
4The triplets w.r.t. infrequent query-url pairs can be ignored in
general. If s is sufficiently small, the shape of the query-url-user
histogram w.r.t. all query-url pairs can be optimally retained.
vacy breach-minimizing problem which asks for minimal privacy
loss while satisfying a certain utility. Third, since we have modeled
the utility-maximizing problems in the optimization framework, it
should be possible to leverage the significant work in the field of
operations research to solve these problems. We intend to explore
these in the future.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
PROOF. Assume that D and D′ differ in an arbitrary user sk’s
user log Ak. In Section 4.1, we discussed two sets of output spaces
Ω = Ω1 ∪ Ω2: all the possible outputs in Ω1 include sk whereas
all the possible outputs in Ω2 does not include sk. Hence, if the
probabilities inequalities in Definition 2 hold for the above Ω1,Ω2,
(ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy can be guaranteed for the
randomization algorithm with this output space split.
First, according to Equation 2, if ∀Ak ⊂ D, 1−
∏
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
(
cij−cijk
cij
)xij ≤ δ (Condition 3) holds, we have Pr[R(D) ∈
Ω1] ≤ δ for any input D. Meanwhile, Condition 1 guarantees
that Pr[R(D) ∈ Ω1] can be effectively bounded by δ. Otherwise,
if a unique query-url pair(qi, uj), given xij > 0, Pr[R(D) ∈ Ω1]
should be equal to 1 with such output space split (no other space
split available for any pair of neighboring input search logs).
Second, for all O ∈ Ω2, we have Pr[R(D′) = O] > 0 and
Pr[R(D) = O] > 0. IfD′ ⊂ D, Condition 2 ensures Pr[R(D)=O]
Pr[R(D′)=O]
≤ 1 ≤ Pr[R(D
′)=O]
Pr[R(D)=O]
≤ eǫ. On the contrary, if D ⊂ D′, Condi-
tion 2 derived from D′ can also guarantees Pr[R(D
′)=O]
Pr[R(D)=O]
≤ 1 ≤
Pr[R(D)=O]
Pr[R(D′)=O]
≤ eǫ.
Thus, the randomization algorithmR satisfies (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic
differential privacy (by dividing output space as above) if three con-
ditions in the theorem hold. Note that the violation of any condition
would result in unbounded multiplicative and/or additive probabil-
ity difference (given ǫ and δ) for at least one input D and/or one of
its neighboring input D′ (Differential privacy will not be guaran-
teed), then the upper bounds ǫ and δ are tight.
B. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
PROOF. W.o.l.g., assume that two arbitrary neighboring search
logs D and D′ differing in one user log: D = D′+Ak and Ô ⊆ Ω
is an arbitrary set of possible outputs. For any input D, we can
divide the output space Ω into two sets Ω1 and Ω2, such that (1)
Pr[R(D) ∈ Ω1] ≤ δ, and for D,D′ (2) ∀O ∈ Ω2, 1/eǫ ≤
Pr[R(D′)=O]
Pr[R(D)=O]
≤ eǫ.
Let Ô1 = Ô ∩ Ω1 and Ô2 = Ô ∩ Ω2, thus: Pr[R(D) ∈ Ô] =∫
∀O∈Ô1
Pr[R(D) = O]dO +
∫
∀O∈Ô2
Pr[R(D) = O]dO
≤
∫
∀O∈Ω1
Pr[R(D) = O]dO + eǫ
∫
∀O∈Ô2
Pr[R(D′) = O]dO
≤ δ + eǫ
∫
∀O∈Ô2
Pr[R(D′) = O]dO
≤ δ + eǫPr[R(D′) ∈ Ô2] ≤ δ + e
ǫPr[R(D′) ∈ Ô].
Similarly, we can prove that Pr[R(D′) ∈ Ô] ≤ δ +
eǫPr[R(D) ∈ Ô].
This completes the proof.
C. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
PROOF. To distinguish two optimal solutions y∗ in the BIP and
the MIP problem, we denote y∗ for the BIP and the MIP problem
as (y∗)B = {∀(y
∗
ij)B} and (y∗)M = {∀(y∗ij)M}.
• Suppose that ∃(y∗ij)B = 0, (y∗ij)M = 1 and ∀z 6= ij, (y∗z)B =
(y∗z )M ((y∗)B and (y∗)M differ in one variable). Due to
(y∗ij)M = 1 and x∗ij ≥ (y∗ij)M , all the constraints ∀Ak ⊂
D,
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
(yij)M · log tijk ≤ min{ǫ, log
1
1−δ
} must
be satisfied for (y∗)M .
In addition, (y∗ij)M > (y∗ij)B =⇒
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D
(y∗ij)M >∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D
(y∗ij)B . As ∀(y∗ij)B satisfies the constraints
∀Ak ⊂ D,
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
(yij)B·log tijk ≤ min{ǫ, log
1
1−δ
}
in the BIP problem,
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D
(y∗ij)M should be the op-
timal value for the BIP problem if other constraints are the
same for two problems (due to∑∀(qi,uj)∈D(y∗ij)M >∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D
(y∗ij)B). Hence, it is a contradiction.
• Suppose that ∃(y∗ij)B = 1, (y∗ij)M = 0 and ∀z 6= ij, (y∗z)B =
(y∗z )M ((y∗)B and (y∗)M differ at one variable). Hence,
the constraints ∀Ak ⊂ D,
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
(yij)B log tijk ≤
min{ǫ, log 1
1−δ
} are satisfied in the BIP problem. In the MIP
problem, if letting xij be 1 for all (y∗ij)B = 1, ∀Ak ⊂ D,∑
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
xij log tijk ≤ min{ǫ, log
1
1−δ
} can be equally
satisfied. In this case, we have
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D
(y∗ij)B
=
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D
xij =
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D
(yij)M
>
∑
∀(qi,uj)∈D
(y∗ij)M
(since ∀(qi, uj) ∈ D, xij = (yij)M ). Hence, (y∗)M is not
the optimal solution of the MIP problem. It is a contradiction.
Therefore, Theorem 2 has been proven.
D. PROOF OF LEMMA 1, 2 AND 3
PROOF. It is similar and straightforward to prove Lemma 1, 2
and 3 (probabilistic differential privacy) using Theorem 1, we thus
prove them together.
The sanitized search log O is generated in terms of the opti-
mal solution of O-UMP, F-UMP or D-UMP. We sample the output
based on the linear relaxed optimal solution x∗ = {⌊x∗ij⌋} (gives
the total count) and the query-url-user histograms in any input D
(gives the individual outcome probabilities). Due to ∀⌊x∗ij⌋ ≤ x∗ij ,
we can infer that {∀(qi, uj) ∈ O, ⌊x∗ij⌋} satisfies the Condition
2 and 3 of Theorem 1 (differential privacy constraints ∀Ak ⊂ D,∑
∀(qi,uj)∈Ak
xij log tijk ≤ min{ǫ, log
1
1−δ
} in O-UMP, F-UMP
or D-UMP are satisfied). Moreover, Condition 1 of Theorem 1 is
also guaranteed in the preprocessing step.
Thus, while sampling user-IDs for any input search log D and
its arbitrary neighboring input D′ with the optimal counts (given
by the optimization problem), we can divide the multinomial sam-
pling output space Ω (derived from D and D′) into Ω1 and Ω2 as
described in Section 4 where all the probabilities in Definition 2 are
bounded by ǫ and δ in such space split (refer Theorem 1). There-
fore, the O/F/D-UMP based sanitization (randomization) algorithm
satisfies (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy (we can add Lapla-
cian noise to ensure differential privacy for the step of computing
the optimal counts if necessary).
This completes the proof.
